Act by the DOJ and the FCC.
One might expect to see little difference in how the competitive effects of mergers are analyzed at the FCC versus DOJ and FTC. After all, the economists at these agencies have similar training and think about industrial organization economics in the same way.
Indeed, some FCC economists have previously worked at the antitrust enforcement agencies, and vice versa. Not surprisingly, moreover, the FCC often looks to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines promulgated by DOJ and FTC for guidance in analyzing horizontal mergers. For this reason, among others, some commentators claim that it is unnecessary and wasteful for multiple agencies to review communications industry mergers; these commentators typically recommend that the FCC defer to the antitrust enforcement agencies.
2 This view downplays the benefits of concurrent jurisdiction over competition questions.
The competition enforcers and the FCC do not necessarily see every proposed merger identically for a number of reasons unrelated to their similar approaches to analyzing the economic effects of a transaction. First, the agencies differ in the scope of their review. Both the FCC and the antitrust enforcers consider competition, but the FCC is also concerned with other public interest goals such as protecting service quality for 4 The difference in focus may be connected to a procedural difference among the agencies. The FCC must review every merger within the communications industries, as the parties cannot consummate their transaction without FCC approval. See 47 U.S.C. §310(d) (forbidding license transfers unless the Commission finds "that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby"). By contrast, the antitrust enforcement agencies have discretion over which mergers to investigate, are notified only as to the largest transactions before consummation, and have prosecutorial discretion to focus their resources on the transactions raising the greatest competitive concern. See generally, Andrew I. Fifth, the agencies differ in their culture. The antitrust enforcers are wary of ongoing supervision of merged firms, so are more skeptical of conduct relief and more inclined toward structural relief than the FCC, 9 which has an ongoing interaction with all sectors of the communications industry.
That ongoing interaction could in theory raise the risk that the sector-specific agency would be "captured" by the regulated industry, leading the agency to act to favor the interests of the industry rather than the public interest. 10 But a sector-specific agency 10 In a strict sense, agency capture requires that regulators expect (perhaps only with probability) to be rewarded with political support or future employment at a regulated firm for decisions favoring the regulated industry relative to how the polity would like it to act. Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 269-70 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998).
The term is also used more broadly to encompass all regulatory decisions that favor the interests of regulated firms relative to the public interest regardless of whether the decisions were adopted by regulators anticipating some reward, and that usage is adopted here. See, e.g., Theodore E. Keeler & Stephen E. Foreman, Regulation and Deregulation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 213 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998). In a psychological sense, it may be natural for staff working only on matters involving one industry to see that industry as important, to identify with it, and to want the firms and their business experiments to succeed. Moreover, when it is costly for the sector-specific agency to learn about the regulated industry, the information on which agency decisions are based may become systematically biased toward what is provided by the regulated firms, leading staff to see issues the way the regulated firms do. In addition, if the political branches of government prefer the interests of regulated industries to what would be desired by the polity as a whole, those branches may use their supervisory can counteract a possible tendency toward systematic bias in favor of relying on evidence provided by the regulated firms. For example, the sector-specific agency may take internal steps to test evidence that are analogous to the kind of discipline the adversarial process imposes on the antitrust agencies-as with FCC Chairman Genachowski"s emphasis on transparent, fact-based, and data-driven decision-making processes.
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Moreover, there are benefits from placing competition review in a sector-specific agency such as the FCC. The FCC has an advantage over the generalist antitrust agencies in fostering competition in communication markets because of the FCC"s industry expertise and broad public interest mandate. These give the FCC the practical ability to take a longer view of the evolution of the industry than is possible for the antitrust agencies. 12 In addition, the FCC can address potential competition issues more easily than the competition enforcers can because of the hurdles the antitrust agencies face in proving a potential competition case in court.
13
These FCC advantages were evident in the way the agencies addressed the possibility of telephone industry mergers in the immediate wake of the 1996 levers-appointments, budget, legislation, and oversight hearings-to encourage sector-specific regulators to share their viewpoint.
rivals, for example by requiring the merged firm to sell unbundled network elements at forward-looking cost.
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The DOJ came out differently. The Justice Department declined to sue and declared that it did not believe the merger violated the antitrust laws. 28 The DOJ statement did not provide a detailed explanation of its reasoning, consistent with the usual practice when an antitrust agency declines to sue, but the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Economics later suggested that the three long distance companies were roughly as good potential rivals as Bell Atlantic, and that three potential competitors were probably enough to protection competition. 29 Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General antitrust explained in a speech that he resolved this "difficult case" against challenging the merger on the basis that "on balance the merger was likely to benefit consumers in that the resulting efficiencies would lead to improved services."
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One interpretation of the different outcomes is that the two agencies simply disagreed about whether the remaining potential competitors provided a sufficient competitive constraint, and on how seriously to take the efficiency claims. But when disagreements between the DOJ or FTC and an industry regulator occur, it is unusual to 27 In re NYNEX Corp., 32 F.C.C.R. 19,985 (1997) . Consistent with the sector-specific agency"s vision of developing more competitive communications markets, the FCC held that it in order to find the transaction in the public interest on competition grounds, the Commission needed to be convinced that the merger "will enhance competition." Id. at ¶2. observe the sector-specific agency acting more aggressively to protect competition than the antitrust agency, so it may be that the DOJ"s analysis of the facts was colored by the practical difficulty an antitrust enforcement agency would face in overcoming the legal hurdles involved in proving a potential competition case to a federal judge.
31
This story illustrates the importance to competition policy of concurrent merger review by a competition enforcement agency alongside a sector-specific agency. In examining telephone industry mergers after the 1996 Act, concurrent review added to competition enforcement; its benefit was not simply from the ability of the expert agency to consider important non-competition public interest goals. The sector-specific agency has the expertise and ability to take a longer view of how the industry should evolve than the antitrust agency, allowing it to identify and address competitive issues that go beyond the practical ambit of antitrust enforcement. By drawing on the strengths of the sectorspecific agency and the competition agency, concurrent review can thus enhance competition enforcement as a whole. 31 In discussing the Justice Department"s review of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics hints at such a concern. Joskow, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. at 188-89. Cf. Nuechterlein & Weiser at 424 ("antitrust authorities may block mergers to protect "potential" competition only in the narrowest of circumstances").
